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ABORTION RIGHTS
This area of the law must necessarily remain unsettled until the
larger questions of inter-school integration are answered. When issues
such as busing are finally laid to rest, the Supreme Court may choose to
advance further in this field by putting a premium on protection of the
individual child's learning experience. Any system relying on testing
will make errors in placement from time to time. Whether the judicial
system will choose to tolerate these mistakes as incidental to the bene-
fits derived from an objective standard of placement remains for the
future.
JACK THORNTON
Constitutional Law-A New Constitutional
Right To An Abortion
The controversy concerning legalized abortion has been active in
the United States for almost twenty years. The medical profession, leg-
islators, and the judiciary have wrestled with the legal, moral, and so-
cial conflicts involved in the abortion issue. Recently in Roe v. Wade1
and a companion case2 the United States Supreme Court determined that
the right of privacy inherent in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment protected a woman's right to choose whether or not to
Id. at 511. It is unclear why such a distinction is drawn, in Hobson (in form) and in
Riles (in fact), when all the classifications are based on race. The present test for
testing the constitutionality of ability grouping therefore appears to be the rational
relationship test and not the compelling state interest one.
1. 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
2. Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973). The decision is important apart from
Wade because Bolton involved an attack on a relatively liberal abortion law adopted by
Georgia in 1968, GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202 (1972). The Court determined that in
spite of the liberal nature of the statute it nevertheless could not stand in view of the
standards established in Wade. The statute established certain procedural require-
ments that must be met before an abortion could be performed. These included re-
quirements that the abortion be performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Com-
mittee on Accreditation of Hospitals; that the operation be approved by the hospital
staff abortion committee; and that the performing physician's judgment be confirmed
by independent examinations of the patient by two other licensed physicians. The
Court held these requirements unconstitutional as having no rational relation to the
statute's purposes, as being unduly restrictive of the patient's rights already safe-
guarded by her physician, and as being an undue infringement on the physician's
right to practice. The statute's residency requirement was found to violate the privi-
leges and immunities clause of the Constitution by denying protection to persons
entering Georgia for medical services.
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terminate her pregnancy, subject only to very limited interference from
the state. This note will discuss two of the constitutionally significant
aspects of the Wade decision-the Court's determination that the ques-
tion was a proper one for judicial resolution under the due process
clause and the Court's decision that the right of privacy includes the
abortion decision. A brief analysis of the common-law and modem
legislative attitudes concerning abortion is helpful in understanding
the Court's holding in Wade.
It is generally accepted that under the English common-law abor-
tion before "quickening" was not a crime.' Similarly, most American
courts have ruled that abortion of an unquickened fetus was not crimi-
nal.4 Some writers believe that a thorough analysis of common-law
history supports the conclusion that women had the common-law lib-
erty of abortion at every stage of gestation. 5 This belief was not shared
by all of the early American courts, however, and several early deci-
sions found the abortion of a quickened fetus to be a misdemeanor. 6
In 1821 Connecticut became the first state to adopt abortion legisla-
tion.7  The statute punished abortion of a quickened fetus but set no
penalty for abortion of a fetus before quickening. Most of the early
statutes dealt severely with abortions of a quickened fetus but pre-
scribed very lenient punishment for abortion prior to that stage.0
During the later decades of the nineteenth century, however, legisla-
tors began to dispense with the quickening distinction and began to
prescribe much harsher penalties. By the end of the 1950's most
states had banned abortion except when necessary to preserve the
mother's life.' 0
Various factors have been advanced to explain enactment of these
3. Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Admin-
istration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. Ruv. 730, 731 (1968). "Quickening" is
the first recognizable movement of the fetus in the uterus. It appears usually from the
sixteenth to eighteenth week of pregnancy. 93 S. Ct. at 716.
4. See, e.g., Edwards v. State, 79 Neb. 251, 252, 112 N.W. 611, 612 (1907);
Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 169, 56 S.E.2d 217, 221 (1949).
5. E.g., Means, The Pheonix of Abortional Freedom: Is A Penumbral or
Ninth-Amendment Right About To Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative
Ashes of A Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335, 336-75
(1971).
6. E.g., Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 55 (1851); Lamb v. State, 67 Md. 524, 533,
10 A. 208, 208 (1887).
7. Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEo. L.J.
395, 435 (1961).
8. CoNN. STAT. tit. 22, § 14 (1821).
9. Quay, supra note 7, at 437.
10. For a good survey of state abortion legislation and important judicial deci-
sions on the subject see Quay, supra note 7, at 447-526.
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highly prohibitive criminal abortion statutes. First, Victorian ideals
of morality were elevated above the right of a married couple to choose
if and when to have children.11 These ideals fostered the belief that the
primary function of sexual activity was procreation and that all at-
tempts at abortion and contraception should therefore be prohibited.
Secondly, legislators began attempting to shield the woman from the
unskilled abortionist by enacting what they considered to be protec-
tive legislation.12 Thirdly and most significantly, the surgical proce-
dure involved in an abortion was dangerous because of the lack of
modem antiseptic techniques and anitibiotics. 13 There is also some
authority for the proposition that the legislators were concerned with
the protection of prenatal life. 4
Beginning in the 1950's a movement was initiated to liberalize the
abortion laws. The initial objective was to accomplish this change
through the legislative process, and to this end the American Law Insti-
tute proposed a statute allowing certain therapeutic abortions.-5 Four-
teen states adopted some form of the American Law Institute proposal.Y6
In 1965 Griswold v. Connecticut 7 opened the door for judicial
resolution of the abortion question. In Griswold the Court struck down
a Connecticut statute' s preventing the use of contraceptives on the
ground that it violated a marital right of privacy found in the penum-
bras of the Bill of Rights. A concurring opinion noted that "the en-
tire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its
specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and
to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the
fundamental rights specifically protected."' 9  After this decision the
judicial attack on abortion legislation was quickly mounted. In Peo-
ple v. Belous20 the California Supreme Court recognized that "the
fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear children fol-
lows from the Supreme Court's and this court's repeated acknowledge-
ment of a 'right to privacy' or 'liberty' in matters relating to mar-
11. Lucas, supra note 3, at 732.
12. Id.
13. Means, supra note 5, at 382-91.
14. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 725-26 (1973).
15. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Draft 1962).
16. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 720 n.37 (1973). This list includes N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971).
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. Act of March 28, 1879, ch. 78, [1879J Conn. Acts 428 (repealed 1969).
19. 381 U.S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
20. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 915 (1970).
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riage, family, and sex."' 1  Numerous suits challenging abortion stat-
utes were brought in both federal and state courts, and a split of au-
thority developed over the question. 22 The Supreme Court addressed it-
self in Wade to this diversity in the lower courts.
The Court was called upon to determine the constitutionality of
the Texas abortion statute, which permitted abortion only "by medical
advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. '23  After re-
solving the issue of standing 24 and reviewing the major historic atti-
tudes concerning abortion,25 the Court held that the "right of privacy,
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of per-
21. Id. at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
22. Some courts struck down abortion statutes. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp.
800 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 93 S. Ct. 1412 (1973); Poe v. Menghini,
339 F. Supp. 986 (D. Kan. 1972); YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J.
1972); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. I11. 1971), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Hanrahan v. Doe, 93 S. Ct. 1410 (1973); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293
(E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970); State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431
(Fla. 1972).
Other courts upheld the statutes. Crossen v. Kentucky, 344 F. Supp. 587 (E.D.
Ky. 1972), vacated and remanded, 93 S. Ct. 1413 (1973); Corkey v. Edwards, 322
F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971), vacated and remanded, 93 S. Ct. 1411 (1973); Stein-
berg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Rosen v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970); Cheaney v. State, - Ind. -, 285
N.E.2d 265 (1972); State v. Abodeely, - Iowa -, 179 N.W.2d 347 (1970); State v.
Munson, - S.D. -, 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972), vacated and remanded, 93 S. Ct. 1416
(1973).
23. 93 S. Ct. at 709.
24. 93 S. Ct. at 712-15. The suit was brought by a single pregnant woman, a
doctor who had been arrested for violating the Texas abortion statute, and a married
couple without children. The Court ruled that the latter two plaintiffs lacked standing
to sue, that the doctor alleged no federally protected right not assertable as a defense
in the state prosecution pending against him, and that the married couple's complaint
was too speculative, but the Court upheld the pregnant woman's right to challenge the
statute. Because of the fact that the woman already had delivered her child, the ques-
tion was technically "moot," but the Court, quoting from Southern Pacific Terminal
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911), held that the issue was "capable of repetition,
yet evading review," and therefore could be heard.
In Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739, 745-46 (1973), the Court granted a group of
physicians standing even though they had not been threatened with prosecution for
violation of the state's abortion statute. The Court granted standing because the
physicians were members of the group against which the statute operates directly and
therefore had a sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment. The Court believed
that they should not be required to become involved in a criminal prosecution before
they could seek judicial relief. The Court distinguished Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961), in which standing was denied a physician challenging a Connecticut statute
prohibiting the giving of medical advice on the use of contraceptives, by noting that
the Connecticut statute was adopted in 1879 and only one physician had ever been
prosecuted under it. 93 S. Ct. at 746. Conversely, the Georgia statute is recent and
its predecessor had been used in several prosecutions. If the Court believes that a
recent and active statute may be challenged by anyone subject to prosecution under it,
it appears that the standing requirement may have been expanded by the Bolton
decision.
25. 93 S. Ct. at 715-24.
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sonal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation
of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's deci-
sion whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."20  The Court de-
termined that the right of privacy is not absolute, however, and can be
regulated when the state can show a compelling interest.27
The state has two interests in the formulation of abortion legisla-
tion: protecting the life and health of the mother and protecting po-
tential life. Balancing these interests against those of the mother, the
Court determined that the state's interest in the mother becomes com-
pelling only after the first three months of pregnancy because prior to
that time it is medically safer to have an abortion than to carry the fe-
tus full term.2" Therefore, prior to the fourth month "the attending
physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, with-
out regulation by the State, that in his medical judgment the patient's
pregnancy should be terminated."2 9  Between the beginning of the
fourth month of pregnancy and the point where the state's interest in
protecting potential life becomes compelling, the state may pass legis-
lation reasonably related to the preservation of the woman's health.30
The Court determined that the state's interest in protecting potential life
becomes compelling at the stage of viability.3 After that stage the state
may completely proscribe abortions except where necessary "to pre-
serve the life or health of the mother."32
It is significant that the Court found the question of abortion legis-
lation a proper one for judicial resolution under the due process
clause. The Court noted 3 Justice Holmes' admonition in Lochner v.
New York3 4 that the Constitution "is made for people of fundamen-
tally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions
natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude
our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them
26. Id. at 727.
27. Id. at 727-28.
28. Id. at 731-32.
29. Id. at 732.
30. As examples of such legislation the Court suggested requirements based on
the qualifications of persons permitted to perform abortions, the procedure to license
such persons, the facility where the abortion may be performed, and the licensing of
the facility. Id.
31. Id. Viability is the point at which the fetus is potentially able to live out-
side the mother's womb. It is usually placed at about seven months but may occur at
an earlier time. Id. at 730.
32. Id. at 732.
33. Id. at 709.
34. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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conflict with the Constitution of the United States."' In Lochner the
Court had invalidated state legislation designed to regulate working
hours among bakery employees in the State of New York. The stat-
ute was held to violate the right to contract that the Court found to be
a liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment. Justices Harlan"0
and Holmes, 37 in vigorous dissents, felt that the Court had no authority
to hold that the statute violated the due process clause. Lochner typi-
fied what is now known as the era of substantive due process, which
lasted for three decades. This constitutional policy was designed to
prevent legislative control over business, and it placed the burden of
justifying legislation upon the state. It required the invalidation of
economic regulatory legislation unless the state could clearly prove
its relation to the public welfare, a burden that was extremely difficult
to carry.3 8 The Lochner approach was applied by the Court to invali-
date various state regulatory statutes.39 But Nebbia v. New York40
and several subsequent cases41 later firmly rejected this theory. The
final blow was dealt by Justice Black in Ferguson v. Skrupa:42 "We
have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do
not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legis-
lative bodies, who are elected to pass laws."4
This repudiation of the Lochner substantive due process approach
has given the defenders of abortion legislation a weapon to use to
persuade courts that the matter of abortion was one strictly for the leg-
islatures. Some judges adopted this approach, believing that the ques-
tion involved the weighing of values that should be accomplished by
the legislators. 44 There appears to be a distinction, however, between
35. Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 74.
37. Id. at 75-76.
38. See Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process
of Law, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 13, 22 (1958).
39. E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
40. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
41. E.g., Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Olsen
v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937).
42. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
43. Id. at 730.
44. See Crossen v. Kentucky, 344 F. Supp. 587, 591 (E.D. Ky. 1972), vacated
and remanded, 93 S. CL 1413 (1973); Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 812
(D. Conn. 1972) (dissenting opinion), vacated and remanded, 93 S. Ct. 1412 (1973);
Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (W.D.N.C. 1971), vacated and
remanded, 93 S. Ct. 1411 (1973); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1395 (N.D. Ill.
1971) (dissenting opinion), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hanrahan v. Doe, 93
S. Ct. 1410 (1973); State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 440 (Fla. 1972) (dissenting
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the Lochner type of substantive due process and that used in Wade to
invalidate state abortion legislation. The difference is between judi-
cial review of legislation affecting personal, fundamental rights essen-
tial to preserving the guarantees of freedom in our society and legis-
lation dealing with economic regulation and control of an industrialized
nation.45 Several Supreme Court decisions have applied substantive due
process criteria in the area of personal, fundamental rights.40 The
Court in Griswold apparently recognized this distinction:
[W]e are met with a wide range of questions that implicate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Overtones of some
arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York . . . should be our
guide. But we decline that invitation. . . . We do not sit as a
super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety
of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social
conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate
relation of husband and wife .... 47
If the Court in Wade has accepted this distinction in the applica-
tion of substantive due process criteria without clearly acknowledg-
ing it48 and has determined that a fundamental, personal right is in-
volved, the discredited Lochner theory should be no barrier to deter-
mining the constitutionality of a state regulatory statute. The risk that
the Court will substitute its judgment for that of the legislature in de-
termining what is wise economic or social policy is inherent in our sys-
tem of judicial review. The basic problem is not whether a court may
review acts of the legislature but rather how wisely it utilizes this
power to identify, appraise, and weigh the competing interests. De-
opinion); Cheaney v. State, - Id. -, -, 285 N.E.2d 265, 269 (1972); State v.
Munson, - S.D. -, -, 201 N.W.2d 123, 127 (1972), vacated and remanded, 93
S. Ct. 1416 (1973).
45. See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of A Doctrine, 64 MIcH. L. Rv. 219,
224 (1965); Lucas, supra note 3, at 756.
46. E.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (right to travel);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (right of association); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to direct child's education); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to marry, establish a home, and bring up children).
In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Court applied the due process
clause of the fifth amendment to strike down segregation in the District of Columbia
public schools.
47. 381 U.S. at 481-82 (emphasis added). The holding in Griswold, however,
was not based on the due process clause. Justice Goldberg, concurring in Griswold,
recognized that a state may experiment with economic legislation but not with funda-
mental rights. 381 U.S. at 496. However, he was not speaking for the majority of
the Court.
48. In Wade Justice Stewart discussed the substantive due process problem but
did not draw any distinction between economic and personal rights. 93 S. Ct. at 733-
34 (concurring opinion). In another concurring opinion, Justice Douglas mentioned
the problem in a footnote. Id. at 758 n.4.
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fining the right involved and determining the appropriate standard to
be applied to legislation affecting that right are two basic aspects in-
volved in this type of judicial review. "To refuse to recognize a right
claimed to be basic to our constitutional order for fear that the Court,
in exercising its power to protect that right, will employ a standard
whereby it usurps the legislative function in determining basic social
policy obscures analysis of the Court's role and denies the Court's re-
sourcefulness in employing standards appropriate to the particular
case."
49
Having examined the method apparently adopted by the Court to
review state abortion legislation, it is necessary to discuss the sub-
stantive right which the Court found to be within the fourteenth amend-
ment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions on state action. The
Court found that the right of privacy includes a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.50
Although the right of privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution, it has been recognized by the Court since 1891.', The
roots of that right have been found to exist in the first amendment,5 2
the fourth and fifth amendments,5" and ninth amendment; 14 in the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights;55 and in the concept of liberty guar-
anteed by the fourteenth amendment.5" It has been applied by the
Court to protect various aspects of the family relationship.5 7  Finally
in Griswold the right was first recognized as an independent doctrine, s
and it has recently been affirmed as applicable to the protection of the
family relationship.59
49. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and
Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MicH. L. REV. 235, 258 (1965).
50. 93 S. Ct. at 727.
51. In Union-Pacific R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court
noted: "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own per-
son, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestion-
able authority of law."
52. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
53. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 350 n.5 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
54. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring).
55. Id. at 484-85.
56. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
57. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925) (education of children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923)
(child rearing).
58. See Emerson, supra note 45, at 228.
59. The Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), said, "If the right
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In order to find whether this right should be applied to abortions
the Court in Wade had first to determine that the right to an abortion
was "fundamental," for "only personal rights . . . deemed to be 'funda-
mental'. . . are included in this guarantee of personal privacy."6 The
only justification given by the Court in granting such status to the abor-
tion decision was the possible detrimental effects on the mother if
she were compelled to deliver the child. These included direct phy-
sical harm, a distressful future life, impairment of mental and physical
health due to child care, and the possible stigma attached to an unwed
mother.0 1 Although these are certainly weighty considerations, per-
haps the Court should have elaborated more fully its finding that the
abortion decision is a "fundamental" right. "Fundamental" has been
defined as being "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 2 as be-
ing "rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people,"'6 3 and as
one of "those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions.' ",64 Since the state
is required to demonstrate a compelling interest in order to regulate
any fundamental right65 and since statutes must be narrowly drawn
so not to exceed this interest, 66 it is hazardous for the Court to grant
"fundamental" status without sufficient justification, for if it does, a
significant number of state regulations may be in jeopardy. In addi-
tion to examining the effects of an unwanted child on the woman,
the Court might have noted that "the Griswold decision rested upon the
broadest and most sweeping principles of substantive constitutional
law" 67 and that the abortion right might be considered more impor-
tant than the rights involved in Griswold. The use of contraceptives
could be considered a first line of defense against an unwanted child, but
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual. . . to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453. Justice Stewart, concurring
in Wade, noted that this right necessarily includes the woman's decision whether to end
her pregnancy or not. 93 S. Ct. at 735.
60. 93 S. Ct. at 726. The Court relied on the test for fundamental status given
in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), holding that the right must be
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty ..
61. 93 S. Ct. at 727.
62. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
63. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
64. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
65. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
66. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
67. Rosen v. Board of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1234 (E.D. La.
1970) (dissenting opinion).
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an abortion is definitely the final means available 8 Then the Court
would at least have established some precedent for its determination.
Combined with the fact that at the time the Constitution was adopted
women had the right to an abortion of a fetus before quickening, 9
these arguments would have made the finding of a fundamental right
more justifiable.
Once the right to an abortion is found to be fundamental, the Court
must determine the state's interests involved so that they can be bal-
anced with the rights of the mother. It is in the process of determin-
ing the state's interests that the major differences of opinion have
arisen, for there is present one highly significant factor that was not
present in Griswold-the existence of a fetus. Even if the courts are
willing to agree that the state's interest in protecting the woman's health
is not sufficiently compelling to justify regulation during all stages of
pregnancy, differing opinions as to the status of the fetus have made
a resolution of the state's interest in protecting potential life extremely
difficult.70
The opponents of reform point to the fact that in other areas of
the law the rights of the fetus are protected.71 Proponents counter
with the observation that in all these areas the rights are protected only
if the fetus is born alive or if the right reflects the parent's interests.72
Proponents also argue that if a fetus constituted human life, the destruc-
tion of the fetus would be murder and that "no prosecutor ever re-
turned a murder indictment charging the taking of the life of a fetus. '7'
The controversy revolves around the religious and moral question of
when a developing fetus acquires "life," or becomes a "human being,"
or attains the status of a "person." As one lower court wisely noted,
"[Wle are constrained simply to conclude that the great conflict
raised by this issue is beyond the competence of judicial resolution."74
Another district court concluded, "[F]or the purposes of this decision,
we think it is sufficient to conclude that the mother's interests are su-
68. Id. at 1237.
69. Means, supra note 5, at 374-75.
70. See Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right To Be Born, 17 W. RES. L. REV.
465 (1965).
71. For a discussion of the rights accorded the fetus see Louisell, Abortion, The
Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 233, 235-44
(1969).
72. See People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 969, 458 P.2d 194, 203, 80 Cal. Rptr.
354, 363 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
73. Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A Constitutional Appraisal, 2
LoYo A U.L. REv. 1, 10 (1969).
74. YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1075 (D.NJ. 1972).
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perior to that of an unquickened embryo, whether the embryo is mere
protoplasm . . . or a human being. . . 7 This position has been
criticized as being opposed to a basic concept of American law that
human beings have a right to live.76
It appears that the issue can be viewed in such a manner that all
references to "life," "human being," and "person" can become a
mere battle of semantics. Adopting such an approach, the Supreme
Court in Wade believed that no resolution of the question of when "life"
begins was necessary. 77  Instead the Court treated the abortion issue as
one involving state interference with individual rights and liberty that,
as such, could be resolved within the framework of the Constitution."8
Viewing the controversy in this way and recognizing the many similar-
ities between the typical abortion statute and the Connecticut contracep-
tive statute struck down in Griswold,7" the Court's opinion in Wade
seems to be a proper extension of the right of privacy to protect the
mother from the consequences of an unwanted child.
The fact that the Supreme Court declined to accept the district
court's determination that the right of privacy was found in the ninth
amendment and instead found the right to be inherent in the due process
clause could indicate that at least seven justices8" have adopted the so-
called fundamental rights interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.
This theory finds no necessary relationship between the fourteenth
amendment and the Bill of Rights but views the due process clause as
incorporating those principles "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty." 81  The divergent views expressed in Griswold over where the
right of privacy was founds' prompted one writer to question whether
75. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis. 1970), appeal dis-
missed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970).
76. Fox, Abortion: A Question of Right or Wrong?, 57 A.B.A.Y. 667, 669
(1971).
77. 93 S. Ct. at 730. However, since the Court held that the state's interest in
protecting potential life becomes compelling when the fetus becomes viable, it can be
argued that the Court actually believes viability to be the point when life begins.
78. See Lucas, supra note 3, at 738.
79. See Leavy & Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis; Therapeutic
Abortion and the Law; New Approaches, 27 Omo ST. L.J 647, 674 (1966).
80. Wade was a seven-to-two decision. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion
for the Court, with Justices Stewart, Burger, and Douglas concurring. Justices Rehn-
quist and White dissented.
81. J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROcEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 5 (1971).
82. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, found it in a penumbra of the Bill
of Rights, 381 U.S. at 480-86. Justice Goldberg seemed to discover it hidden in the
ninth amendment, id. at 486-99 (concurring opinion); Justices Harlan and White be-
lieved the right to be inherent in the due process clause, id. at 499-507 (concurring
opinions). Justices Black and Stewart refused to "find" the right anywhere since it is
not specifically mentioned in the document, id. at 507-31 (dissenting opinions).
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the Court would find that rights not specified in the Bill of Rights are
nevertheless protected by the due process clause.83 The Wade decision
has answered that question in the affirmative.
The Wade decision has several practical consequences in addition
to its constitutional implications. The decision rendered virtually
every state abortion statute invalid."4 The so-called abortion mills in
which any woman with enough money could obtain an abortion will be
eliminated, along with the need for some women to travel to another
state or country to obtain the services of a licensed physician. Those
concerned with population control now have a legitimate tool with
which to work. Competent doctors can now feel free to provide
what is best for their patients without undue concern for legal interfer-
ence. Most importantly, a woman who has no other hesitations about
abortion will no longer be forced to evade the law. Since the decision
was quite detailed, the states should have an adequate guide to the type
of regulation that is now permissible. Since the leaders of the Catholic
Church are violently denouncing the decision,8" however, a struggle
may emerge between the Catholic hospitals and state enforcement of the
new procedure, expecially in areas where the Catholic hospital is the
only one available.
In light of the Wade decision the Supreme Court appears to be ready
to apply substantive due process standards to those rights found to be
personal and fundamental, whether they are specifically mentioned in the
Bill of Rights or not. In addition, the Court may apply the right of
privacy to more varied situations in the future. The practical conse-
quences of the abortion decision have evoked both criticism and praise
from the various factions concerned with the abortion controversy,80
but in the end, as one speaker has said, "this whole matter is eventually
going to be resolved by the conscience of the individual who desires
to have an abortion or not, to the exclusion of what the law, the mor-
alist, or the medical profession has to say."18 7
ROBERT L. WATT Im
83. See Kauper, supra note 49, at 249.
84. It appears that only the New York abortion statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW §
125.05 (McKinney Supp. 1972), may survive the Wade decision. This provision al-
lows an abortion during the first twenty-four weeks of pregnancy without qualifica-
tion, if performed by a duly licensed physician with the woman's consent.
85. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 5, 1973, at 27.
86. Id.
87. Marchetti, Symposium-Law, Morality, and Abortion, 22 RTrro .s L. REV.
415, 423 (1968).
[Vol. 511584
